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Abstract
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Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget con-
straint implies strong testable restrictions on the properties of demand func-
tions. Empirical applications to data on households however often reject
these restrictions. In particular, such data frequently show a failure of Slut-
sky symmetry - the restriction of symmetry on the matrix of compensated
price responses (see for example Deaton (1990), Browning and Meghir (1991),
Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) and Browning and Chiappori (1998)).
From the theoretical point of view, the inadequacy of the single consumer
model as a description of decision making for households with more than one
member has also long been recognised. Attempts to reconcile this model with
the existence of several sets of individual preferences have been made for in-
stance by Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1974, 1991) but rely upon restrictive
assumptions about preferences or within-household decision mechanisms (see
Bergstrom, 1989; Cornes and Silva, 1999).
A large body of recent research has investigated alternative models accom-
modating more realistic descriptions of within-household decision-making
processes. E±ciency of household decisions holds in a number of models
of household behaviour which have been suggested: for instance in the Nash
bargaining models of Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981)
and McElroy (1990), and in Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene
(1994) and Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994). However, it is not a prop-
erty of noncooperative models such as those of Ulph (1988) and Chen and
Woolley (2001).
3An important advance is made by Browning and Chiappori (1998), who
show that under the assumption of e±cient within-household decision mak-
ing, the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix for demands from a k member
household is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank k ¡ 1.
Tests on Canadian data are found to reject symmetry for couples, but not
for single individual households. The hypothesis that the departure from
symmetry for the sample of couples has rank 1, as implied by the assump-
tion of e±ciency, is also not rejected. This work is important not only in
¯lling a gap in our theoretical understanding of demand behaviour but also
in the prospect which it presents of reconciling demand theory and data on
consumer behaviour.
While the inability of Browning and Chiappori to reject the symmetry
and rank condition for couples is intriguing, it is not clear what power it
has, if any, as a test of e±ciency of intrahousehold decisions, unless one
understands the nature of the departure from symmetry under the principal
alternative models of household decision making.
If noncooperative models give rise to a departure of similar rank as that
obtained under the assumption of e±ciency, this would obviously not be a
feature of demand behaviour which would be of use in discriminating be-
tween these alternative assumptions. On the other hand, if the departure
from symmetry under noncooperative behaviour is of greater rank, then the
Browning-Chiappori result not only reconciles assumptions of optimising be-
haviour with demand data, but also provides evidence in favour of the collec-
tively rational model against other descriptions of within-household decision
4making.1
In this paper, we establish properties of demands in noncooperative mod-
els with several voluntarily contributed public goods. Models of this type
warrant attention in their own right as marking an opposite extreme to fully
e±cient models of the sort described above. They are also interesting in so
far as the equilibria in such models can be considered as the fallback position
in bargaining models as suggested, for example, in Chen and Woolley (2001).
Models of voluntarily contributed public goods have relevance beyond
analysis of household demand. When they involve more than two players,
these models can be used to represent a variety of situations involving private
contributions to public goods either in the national or international context.
What distinguishes what we have termed the \household Nash equilibrium
model" from the general Nash equilibrium model is the number of agents,
which is two in the case considered here.
We concentrate attention on interior equilibria in which each partner
contributes to all the public goods.2 Such equilibria have important income
pooling properties which help render the description of demand properties
tractable. In section 2, we establish conditions under which there can be
no more than one such equilibrium and derive conditions on preferences and
income shares allowing for existence. In section 3, we show that equilibrium
quantities vary with prices and household income in ways compatible with
1In general, Nash bargaining and other speci¯c cooperative models should not give rise
to a departure from symmetry of a lower rank than that of the collective model. See
McElroy and Horney (1981, 1990) and Chiappori (1988,1991) for a discussion of price
e®ects in the Nash bargaining model.
2Speci¯cally, what we mean is that neither partner would like to reduce the household's
spending on any public good but cannot because they do not contribute to it.
5the adding up and homogeneity properties of unitary demands and that nega-
tivity and symmetry properties will generally be violated, as in the collective
model. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that
it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric matrix and another the
rank of which never exceeds one plus the number of public goods. The depar-
ture from symmetry therefore typically falls considerably short of full rank.
Section 4 is devoted to the properties of demands for speci¯c forms of prefer-
ences. Indeed, additional restrictions on preferences reduce the rank further,
but it falls to the rank one departure seen in the collective setting only un-
der very restrictive assumptions - for example, separability of public goods
and identical preferences. These results imply that the Browning-Chiappori
assumption of e±ciency can be tested against other models within the class
of those based on individual optimisation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Household Nash equilibrium with volun-
tary contributions to the public goods
2.1 The model
Consider a household with two individuals, A and B. The household spends
on a set of m private goods q 2 Rm and n public goods Q 2 Rn. The
quantities purchased by the individuals are qA, qB, QA and QB with total
household quantities q ´ qA + qB and Q ´ QA + QB: Individual utility
functions are uA(qA;Q) and uB(qB;Q), assumed increasing and di®erentiable
in all arguments, so that individual preferences are de¯ned over the sum of
contributions to the public goods. The partners have incomes of yA and yB:
6Household income is denoted y ´ yA+yB. Prices of private and public goods
respectively are the vectors p and P.
Each person decides on the purchases made from their income so as to
maximise their utility subject to the spending decisions of their partner. We






















B ¸ 0; q
B ¸ 0
where inequalities should be read where appropriate as applying to each
element of the relevant vector. We assume at least one private good for each
partner and at least one public good are consumed in positive quantities in
all equilibria considered below.
This problem can be considered as one where each agent has to choose
the level of the public goods for the household, subject to the constraint
that this level is greater than or equal to the contribution of the other agent.
Given that yA = y ¡ p0qB ¡ P 0QB; and similarly for B; the agents'problems
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0Q · y ¡ p
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B;Q) s. t. p
0q
B + P
0Q · y ¡ p
0q
A; Q ¸ Q
A q
B ¸ 0
A household Nash equilibrium consists of a set of quantities (qA;qB;Q)
simultaneously solving these two problems. We call such an equilibrium an
7interior household Nash equilibrium if non-negativity constraints on public
good contributions Q ¸ QB and Q ¸ QA are binding on neither partner. In




















where fA(:) and F A(:) are Marshallian demand functions corresponding to
A's preferences and together satisfying the usual demand properties and fB(:)
and F B(:) are demand functions corresponding to B's preferences, of which




P and F i
y; F i
p; F i
P for i = A;B; with respect to income y
and price vectors p and P respectively.
Note that it is natural to consider the equilibria in terms of quantities of
public goods Q rather than in terms of levels of individual contributions QA
and QB since the equilibrium in terms of the latter is indeterminate when
the number of public goods n is greater than one. Since individuals care only
about the level of public goods and not about the level of their individual
contributions, it makes no di®erence to either of them whether, say, A pays
for the heating and B for the housing or vice versa given the quantities Q.
3While fA and fB are not themselves reaction functions, note that (1) and (2) can be
used to de¯ne reaction functions for qA and qB given y, p and P if regarded as de¯ning
responses of each as a function of the other.
82.2 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Equilibria of this type have important properties.





y · 1 ¡ a for some a > 0; i = A;B; (5)
then
1. (Existence and uniqueness for private goods) there exist unique qA, qB
satisfying (1) and (2) and
2. (Income pooling for private goods) these quantities depend only on
(y;p;P).



















so that the value of xA in household Nash equilibrium is a ¯xed point of »A(¢).
Given (5) then »A(¢) is a contraction mapping and therefore has a unique ¯xed
point by the Banach ¯xed point theorem. This uniquely determines values
for qB from (2) and then for qA from (1). Given uniqueness, it is immediate
from (6) that these equilibrium values depend only on (y;p;P).
9In what follows we assume normality of public and private goods in the
sense of (5). Let us denote the mappings from (y;p;P) to these unique
interior equilibrium private good vectors by µA(y;p;P) and µB(y;p;P).
Lemma 2 1. (Existence and uniqueness for public goods) There exists a















2. (Income pooling for public goods) equilibrium public good quantities de-
pend only on (y;p;P).
Proof. Given that private good quantities in interior equilibrium are de-
termined uniquely by Lemma 1, (3) and (4) provide alternative equations for
equilibrium quantities of the public goods and (8) is a necessary and su±cient
condition for these to coincide. If they do coincide, then income pooling for
public goods follows immediately from the income pooling result for private
goods. These quantities constitute an interior household equilibrium if the
nonnegativity constraints bind on neither household member, which will be
the case if each partner has income su±cient to purchase the interior equi-
librium private goods quantities µA(y;p;P) and µB(y;p;P) as stated in (9).
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are considered for the case of one
public good and k contributors by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986, 1992)
10and Fraser (1992). We are not aware of a previous proof of uniqueness of the
interior equilibrium with many goods. The income pooling result shows that
provided that a redistribution of income between the partners does not take
the household out of interior equilibrium, quantities consumed in equilibrium
are invariant. This result is well known and has been discussed by many
authors. Warr (1983) established income pooling for the case of a single
public good and Kemp (1984) extended the claim to the case of multiple
public goods, assuming interior equilibrium. Kemp's proof is queried by
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) who o®er an alternative proof.
Though often found surprising, the source of the result is easily illustrated
for the three good case in Figure 14. Any allocation of total household
income y across the three goods qA, qB and Q can be represented as a point
in the triangular area ADO with the shares of household income spent on
private goods represented by the distances along the axes and the remaining
share allocated to the public good given by the perpendicular distance to the
boundary AD. Given any amount spent on the private good of individual A,
the remainder of household income is spent on goods of interest to individual
B and the line AEB represents B's preferred allocation between qB and Q.
Correspondingly, the line DEC represents A's preferred allocation between
qA and Q given any amount spent on qB. The line AEB and DEC represent
graphically the reaction functions implied by equations (1) and (2). The
intersection at E shows an allocation over the three goods with which each
partner is content given the spending decisions of the other. This point is
4Ley (1996) presents several diagrammatic representations of the Bergstrom, Blume
and Varian (1986) model though not that of Figure 1.
11clearly unique if the slope of AEB is always more negative than -1 and that
of DEC always between 0 and -1 which will be the case if Q and q are normal
in the preferences of A and B. This point will be an interior household Nash
equilibrium if it involves neither partner spending more than their private
income on their own private good. Private income shares yA=y and yB=y are
shown on the diagram and in this case exceed household budget shares for
the private goods at E so that E is the unique household Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore it is clear that small changes in the income shares will not
alter the location of this equilibrium, which is the income pooling result.
Noninterior equilibria will pertain in cases of su±ciently extreme income
shares and the locus of all equilibria is given by the line CEB.
Existence depends critically on compatibility of public good demands
in a way that requires a certain coincidence of individual preferences, which
may be more or less thoroughgoing depending upon assumptions made about
separability of public goods in individual preferences.
Let us denote the mapping from (y;p;P) to interior equilibrium public
goods quantities, if these exist, by £(y;p;P) and assume that the equilibrium
mappings are all di®erentiable. One implication of interior equilibrium that
we make use of below is a requirement that public good Engel curves be
proportional in the sense that each partner should wish to spend household
funds allocated to the public goods in similar proportions at the margin. To
state this result, de¯ne5 ® ´ 1 ¡ P 0F A
y = p0fA
y and ¯ ´ 1 ¡ P 0F B
y = p0fB
y .
Lemma 3 (Engel curve proportionality for public goods) Individual Engel
5Note that ® and ¯ are scalars and are de¯ned by slopes of demand functions rather
than slopes of equilibrium conditions.
12curves for public goods are proportional in the sense that
F
A
y =(1 ¡ ®) = F
B
y =(1 ¡ ¯): (10)
Proof. Di®erentiating (3) and (4) gives
F
A
y (1 ¡ p
0µ
B
y ) = F
B





































y (1 ¡ ¯)=(1 ¡ ®¯) = F
B
y (1 ¡ ®)=(1 ¡ ®¯):
from which (10) follows immediately.
This is clearly a strong restriction but does not exhaust the implications
of existence of such an equilibrium. Interior equilibria exist only if public
goods choices made by the partners are compatible in the sense of (8). Since
both partners face the same relative prices, the same total quantities of the
jointly contributed public goods can constitute solutions to the individual
optimisation problems only if marginal rates of substitution between these
13public goods are the same for both partners. Equivalently, we require the










A(y;p;P);Q) = P (11)
for some ¸A; ¸B > 0 and subject to P 0Q = y ¡ p0µA(y;p;P) ¡ p0µB(y;p;P).
This is a system of equations which is clearly typically insoluble (since there
are n + 2 unknowns with which to satisfy 2n + 1 equations including the
budget constraint). Nonetheless restrictions on preferences which either tie
together the equilibrium private good quantities in a useful way or which
enforce some sort of separability between public and private goods choices
can make an interior equilibrium possible.
In particular, we may note that interior equilibria exist if private goods
can be partitioned, qi = (qi
0;qi
1); i = A;B, in such a way that individual








1;Q)) i = A;B (12)
for some Ài(:;:); i = A;B and some common subutility function º(:;:).
Lemma 4 If individual preferences take the form (12) then there exists a
range of income shares over which there exists an interior household Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Let the price vector for private goods be similarly partitioned
p = (p0;p1). Given weak separability of (qi
1;Q) in each partner's preferences
and the common subutility function, we know that two stage budgetting
6We consider only public goods which are bought in positive quantities in equilibrium.
Relaxing this would raise no interesting issues.
14will hold (Blackorby, Primont and Russell 1978) with a common lower stage.
Therefore there exists a function g(:) such that
q
A




























Given uniqueness of private goods quantities in interior equilibrium, by Lemma
1, and the symmetry of these equations it must be that µA
1 (y;p;P) = µB
1 (y;p;P) =
µ¤
1(y;p;P) for some common µ¤
1(y;p;P) so equilibrium quantities of the sepa-
rable private goods are equal for the two partners. Furthermore, using weak












which is generically soluble since it involves only n +2 equations. Hence (8)
can be satis¯ed and an interior household Nash equilibrium exists for income
shares satisfying (9).
This class of preferences covers all particular cases in which we are aware






i;Q)) i = A;B (13)
for some common º(:;:). In this case, since there exists a unique interior
equilibrium (given appropriate income shares) de¯ned by equations which
are fully symmetric, the partners consume identical quantities in equilibrium:
µA(y;p;P) = µB(y;p;P) = µ¤(y;p;P) for some common µ¤(y;p;P).
15It also covers the case in which public goods are separable with a common





i;º(Q)) i = A;B (14)
and therefore, trivially, also the case usually considered in which there is
only one public good, n = 1. Both (13) and (14) can be shown to imply
particularly special properties for equilibrium demands and we pay particular
attention to them below in section (4).
16Figure 1: Household Nash equilibrium
173 Properties of equilibrium demands in the
general case




B = µ(y;p;P) Q = £(y;p;P)
of the same economic determinants y, p and P as would be the case under the
\unitary" model where the household maximises a household utility function
given the household budget constraint. Distinguishing unitary and nonco-
operative household behaviour therefore requires that we establish whether
these equilibrium quantities have properties dissimilar to demands in unitary
households. Browning and Chiappori (1998) provide such an analysis for the
collective model, and Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2004) examine the
relationship between collective and unitary models.
The properties of unitary demands are the standard Hurwicz-Uzawa (1971)
integrability requirements of adding up, homogeneity, negativity and sym-
metry.
3.1 Adding up and homogeneity
It is easy to establish that the household Nash equilibrium quantities satisfy
adding-up and homogeneity.
Theorem 1 Household Nash equilibrium demands satisfy
1. (Adding up) p0µ(y;p;P) + P 0£(y;p;P) = y
182. (Homogeneity) µ(¸y;¸p;¸P) = µ(y;p;P) and £(¸y;¸p;¸P) = £(y;p;P)
for any ¸ > 0.
Proof.
1. Adding up of demands in household Nash equilibrium follows from
the fact that the partners are on their individual budget constraints
and the sum of their demands therefore satis¯es the household budget
constraint.
2. Equilibrium quantities satisfying (1), (2) and (3) and (4) will satisfy
homogeneity given homogeneity of the individual demand functions.
3.2 Negativity and symmetry
Negativity and symmetry are less simply dealt with. These are concerned in
the case of the unitary model with the properties of the Slutsky matrix, the
matrix of price responses at ¯xed household utility. Since household utility
is unde¯ned in a noncooperative setting, no such matrix is de¯ned but we
can adopt the Browning and Chiappori (1998) notion of the \pseudo-Slutsky














composed in a comparable way from derivatives of the equilibrium house-
hold quantities with respect to prices and income. This is what would be
calculated as the Slutsky matrix if the household were treated as behaving
19according to the unitary model. The properties of the Pseudo-Slutsky matrix
can then be examined by relating its terms to the \true" compensated price
e®ects on the functions fA; fB; F A and F B; which correspond to the indi-
vidual utility functions assumed to have given rise to the observed behaviour
of the household.
Noting that at the equilibrium, µA(y;p;P) = fA(y ¡ p0qB;p;P) and sim-
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is an appropriate aggregating matrix.
20The matrix M has a block lower triangular structure which makes it
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Note that the terms in © are all elements of the underlying true individual





















Lemma 5 The pseudo Slutsky matrix admits the decomposition
ª = ª
A + ª























































and RA = In¡F A
y P 0=P 0F A
y , RB = In¡F B
y P 0=P 0F B
y . Furthermore RA = RB
is an idempotent matrix of rank n ¡ 1.
Proof. The decomposition is established in the Appendix. That RA =
RB follows from the Engel curve proportionality result in Lemma 3. Idem-
potency follows from RiF i
y = 0; i = A;B. The rank of an idempotent matrix
is equal to its trace (Magnus and Neudecker, 1988, p.20) and the trace of Ri
is n ¡ P 0F i
y=P 0F i
y = n ¡ 1 for i = A;B.
Both ªA and ªB are individual Slutsky matrices and therefore negative
semide¯nite and symmetric. The departure from negativity and symmetry
in the pseudo-Slutsky matrix ª therefore depends on the properties of the
matrices ¤ and ¢.
Theorem 2 The pseudo-Slutsky matrix ª is the sum of a negative semidef-
inite symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank no greater than n + 1.
Proof. ªA+ªB is symmetric and negative semide¯nite since ªA and ªB
both are. The rank of ¤ is no greater than the rank of Ri which is established
in Lemma 5 to be n¡1. ¢, being the sum of two outer products of vectors,
is of rank no greater than 2 in general.
224 Speci¯c preferences
Theorem 2 establishes an upper bound for the rank of the departure from
symmetry and negativity. Particular restrictions on preferences will however
reduce this bound further. Two speci¯c special cases have been identi¯ed
above - those of identical preferences (13) and separability of public goods
(14).
4.1 Identical preferences
Under identical preferences, interior equilibria are symmetric in the sense
that private good quantities are identical for the two partners. This reduces
the rank of the departure from symmetry and negativity by one.
Theorem 3 Given identical preferences (13), the pseudo-Slutsky matrix ª
is the sum of a negative semide¯nite symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank
no greater than n.
Proof. Since private goods quantities are identical, the two outer prod-
ucts of vectors in ¢ are identical and therefore ¢ has rank n
4.2 Separability of public goods
Separability of public goods with a common public goods subutility as in (14)
o®ers an interesting case. In particular we know that the separable structure





































0) + GP; i = A;B
where GX is the partial derivative of G(:) with respect to its ¯rst argument.
Substituting the ¯rst of these expressions into the de¯nition of Ri and noting


































0 + GP ´ Ã; i = A;B (17)
where we may note that Ã, being the Slutsky matrix corresponding to the
preferences º(Q), is itself symmetric and negative semide¯nite.
Theorem 4 Given separable and identical preferences over public goods (14),
the pseudo-Slutsky matrix ª is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix
of rank no greater than 2.
24Proof. By (16) and (17), ¤ is itself symmetric and negative semide¯nite
therefore ª is the sum of a symmetric matrix ªA + ªB ¡ ¤ and a matrix ¢
of rank no greater than 2.
Combining the assumptions of fully identical preferences and separability
of public goods reduces the rank of the departure to unity, that established for
the collective model by Browning and Chiappori (1998). It is interesting to
ask whether there are other conditions under which this is so in a noncoopera-


























. Remembering that F A
y =(1¡®) = F B
y =(1¡¯),
it can be shown that the former, for instance, is true only if fA
y =® = fB
y =¯,
which is to say that Engel curves for private goods are also proportional.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we establish properties of demands in the Nash equilibrium
with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. This non-
cooperative model is the polar case to the cooperative model of Browning
and Chiappori (1998). In reality, neither the assumption of fully e±cient co-
operation nor of complete absence of collaboration is likely to be an entirely
accurate description of typical household spending behaviour and analysis of
such extreme cases can be seen as a ¯rst step towards understanding of a
more adequate model.
We focus on interior equilibria in which each partner contributes to all
the public goods. Although this involves assuming nonbinding the constraint
25that neither partner should spend more than their private income on goods
of private interest to themselves, this is anyway likely to be a fairly soft con-
straint in real circumstances where the distinction between partners' incomes
is neither practically nor legally clearcut.
We derive the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
and we show that adding-up and homogeneity hold. We show that the nature
of the departure from unitary demand properties in household Nash equilib-
rium is qualitatively similar to that in collectively e±cient models in that
negativity and symmetry of compensated price responses is not guaranteed.
The counterpart to the Slutsky matrix can be shown to depart from neg-
ativity and symmetry by a matrix of bounded rank but this rank typically
exceeds that found in the collective model unless strong auxiliary restrictions
are placed on preferences. In the Nash equilibrium, the deviation from sym-
metry falls to the rank one deviation seen in the collective setting only under
very restrictive assumptions - for example, separability of public goods and
identical preferences. However, under the sole assumption of separability of
the public goods, the deviation is a matrix of rank 2. These results imply
that the Browning-Chiappori assumption of e±ciency can be tested against
other models within the class of those based on individual optimisation.
26Appendix

























for i = A;B















for i = A;B:
We derive the elements of ª as follows. Dealing ¯rstly with the upper
submatrices, we have, from ª = EM¡1©,



















































































using the adding up restrictions above.









































However, from the Engel curve proportionality result in Lemma 3, F A
y P 0 =
(1 ¡ ®)F A
y P 0=(1 ¡ ¯). Using this together with the identity (1 ¡ ®)=(1 ¡
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